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Stoic Echoes in non-Stoic Sources:
Exploring Stoic Influence in the First and 
Second Centuries CE
Vicky Balabanski
This article examines David Hahm’s claim that “more people in the Mediterranean 
world would have held a more or less Stoic conception of the world than any other from 
the third century BCE to the second century CE”. If this is so, most New Testament 
studies do not take this adequately into account. Focussing on the first and second 
centuries CE, this paper addresses the barriers to an accurate assessment of this claim, 
then considers the approach of two scholars in this area. Then three geographically 
diverse texts of the period specifically not written by Stoic adherents are examined for 
evidence of Stoic influence (Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho, Ch. 2; Philo’s De 
aeternitate mundi, paragraph 24, & Acts 17.15–34). What these analyses show is that 
Stoic ideas were known and discussed in this period among those who were not Stoic 
proponents, strengthening the case for widespread Stoic influence.
In 1977, David Hahm published a study called The Origins of Stoic Cosmology in 
which he stated that
For half a millennium Stoicism was very likely the most widely accepted world view in 
the Western world. Although there was, of course, never a single all-pervasive world 
view in antiquity, yet from the third century B.C. to the second century A.D. more 
people in the Mediterranean world seem to have held a more or less Stoic conception 
of the world than any other. (Hahm, 1977:xiii)
This claim, which functions as the platform for Hahm’s systematic study of the 
formative influences on Stoic physics, has not been explicitly refuted, yet neither has 
it been taken sufficiently seriously.
For the field of New Testament studies, this claim is both intriguing and important. 
What makes it controversial for the study of Judaeo-Christian history is the fact that 
the rise of Christian Neo-Platonism masks what influence Stoicism may have had on 
early Christian thought. If true, it would run against the widely-accepted assumption 
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that the Christian proclamation was received positively among pagan groups due 
to their contact and association with synagogues as God-fearers, or due to Platonic 
influences that were later embraced as Neo-Platonism. My own research interest in 
the influence of Stoic thought on early Christian theology arises from the significant 
parallels between the Pauline Letter to the Colossians and Stoic ideas (Balabanski, 
2008, 2010a, 2010b).
This paper explores how one might give further evidence for Hahm’s claim that 
Stoicism was considered the pre-eminent path to wisdom by seeing if this influence 
is apparent outside the circles of Stoicism’s own adherents in the first and second 
centuries CE. The claim is plausible, prima facie, for the period of the late Stoa. In 
the first and second centuries CE we have notable Stoics including Lucius Annaeus 
Seneca (4 BCE–65 CE), Musonius Rufus, (c. 20–30 to c. 101 CE), Epictetus (c. 55–135 
CE) — a Phrygian slave and later freedman whose master had him study under 
the Stoic Musonius Rufus and who subsequently influenced not only his student 
Arrian (c. 86–160 CE) but also Emperor Hadrian (76–138 CE) 1 and Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius (121–180 CE), the most famous Stoic of the period under scrutiny. We also 
know of other Stoic philosophers in these centuries — for example, Lucius Annaeus 
Cornutus, Publius Egnatius Celer and Hierocles the Stoic. Even considering just the 
best-known Stoics of the first and second centuries CE, we can see that the influence 
of Stoic philosophy was not limited to Athens or Rome, but was also current in Asia 
Minor (through at least Epictetus and Arrian). So it is plausible that the influence of 
Stoicism was widespread in this period.
But how does one move beyond the prima facie position proposed by Hahm and 
demonstrate that it is not just plausible but probable that Stoic ideas were highly 
influential, even pre-eminent, in this period? How does one establish the relative 
influence of Stoic thought (in comparison with other philosophical schools) in a 
particular period or region? In this paper, I define as Stoic influence either explicit 
reference to Stoic philosophy or philosophers, or a positive or negative refraction of 
a distinctively Stoic concept,2 or an aspect of the tripartite Stoic “system” — Physics, 
Ethics and Logic (Diogenes Laertius 7.39–41, in Long & Sedley, vol. 1:158).
In order to address this question of Stoic influence, I will first review the barriers to 
an accurate assessment, and then consider the approaches of two scholars whose work 
sheds some light on this question. Then I consider three Greek sources as case-studies 
from diverse locations and religious affiliations which are not from self-professed Stoic 
writers. If Stoicism was indeed influential, it must have influenced writers beyond its 
1 Aelius Spartianus describes Hadrian as treating with the “greatest friendship the philosophers Epictetus 
and Heliodorus”, in The Life of Hadrian, 16.
2 The following key terms are associated with Stoic philosophy, listed in alphabetical order:
adiaphora, apatheia, apokatastasis, ataraxia, diairesis, eudaimonia, heimarmenē, homologia, kata-
lepsis, kathekon, logos, oikeiosis, physis, pneuma, prohaeresis. Other key terms are shared with other 
philosophical schools, including diairesis, hexis, hulē or ousia, pneuma, prokopē, Sophos.
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own adherents. But by choosing sources that are not explicitly Stoic, I am also looking 
for ones that are not explicitly promoting another philosophical school.
In this paper, of the three sources I have selected, two are Christians and one is 
Jewish.
1) Justin Martyr (Flavia Neapolis in Samaria, in the Roman province of Judea) 
Dialogue with Trypho, Ch. 2. (Justin’s dates are c. 100–165 CE; Dialogue was 
written c. 150–160 CE).
2) Philo (Alexandria) De aeternitate mundi, paragraph 24.
3) Luke’s depiction of Paul in Athens, Acts 17.15–34 (which reflects traditions 
from Syrian Antioch and other parts of the Roman Empire).
In their search for wisdom, each of these writers identified their religious affiliation 
as primary rather than any particular philosophical school. All of these are (arguably)3 
first and second century CE sources, predating the imperial benefaction of the chair 
in Stoic philosophy in 174 CE by Marcus Aurelius. My treatment of them makes no 
claims to being comprehensive. Instead, I take a sounding of them, seeking evidence 
for Stoic ideas. I conclude that each of these writers enables us to observe Stoic influ-
ence extending beyond the sphere of Stoic adherents.
Factors that render it difficult to assess Stoic influence in 
this period
There are several reasons why this endeavour is by no means straightforward. The first 
reason is an obvious one — the very fragmentary preservation of most Stoic sources. 
Despite the considerable body of Stoic material we do have, only a tiny fraction — not 
even one percent — of the writings of Hellenistic philosophy which existed in the first 
century CE has been preserved into the present.4 Most of what has been preserved of 
the early Stoics is embedded in the writings of others who did not share their views, 
and wished to refute them. Hence, all reconstructions of early Stoic doctrine must 
rely on second and third-hand reports, or on later Stoic writers. Today we rely on 
collections of sources, in particular, the Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (SVF), the 
two-volume collection by A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley under the title The Hellenistic 
Philosophers, and B. Inwood and L. Gerson’s Hellenistic Philosophy. Our reliance on 
such collections, excellent though they may be, may give the impression that Stoic 
philosophy was long — perhaps always — overshadowed by its debating partners.
3 The dating of Acts is contested. Richard I. Pervo argues that the widely-held dating of Acts to the late 
first century is inaccurate, and dates it to c. 115 CE (Pervo, 2006).
4 “Epicurus and Chrysippus wrote, between them, works amounting to more than a thousand books 
(i.e. scrolls of papyrus). So the total literary output of Hellenistic philosophy must have run into many 
thousands of books. From these, all that survive intact are three epitomes and a set of maxims by Epi-
curus, and a hymn by Cleanthes” (Long & Sedley, vol. 1:8).
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Preservation of, and access to, Stoic sources is not just a contemporary issue, but 
one already present by the fourth century CE. Ilaria Ramelli writes that
in Origen’s day [185–254 CE] Stoic sources were still available ... Shortly before 
Origen’s birth, Marcus Aurelius, the last major Imperial Stoic, in 176 CE endowed 
four chairs of philosophy in Athens, one of which was Stoic. By the time of Gregory 
[of Nyssa], in the second half of the fourth century [c. 335–394], the availability of 
Old Stoic texts seems to have become scanty.1 According to Themistius, these were 
available in public libraries but were rare. Themistius explicitly speaks of the works of 
Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, besides Aristotelian and Platonic works, as available 
in the library of Constantinople and thereby saved from a total vanishing precisely by 
being kept there (Or. 4.13.60B). (Ramelli, 2014:136)
Ramelli goes on to write that while Plato’s and Aristotle’s texts were still owned by 
private citizens in their libraries, those of the [Hellenistic] Stoics were only available 
in public libraries (Ramelli, 2014:136).
This state of affairs suggests that by the mid to late fourth century in Constan-
tinople, Old Stoic texts were not being copied or taught as part of the educational 
curriculum. The mid-third to mid-fourth centuries CE witnessed the major cultural 
and religious changes associated with Diocletian’s Great Persecution, the rise of Con-
stantine I and the first Council of Nicaea. In terms of influential philosophers in this 
period, we can name Lactantius (c. 250–c. 325), whose lectures may have been heard 
by Constantine (Barnes, 1981:47, 73–74; Fowden, 1988:175–176). Lactantius writes 
in praise of Socrates and Plato in De Ira Dei and against Epicureans and slightly more 
mildly against Stoics (De Ira Dei, Ch. 5:261–262). Thus, we can say that due to the 
political, cultural and religious shifts of the mid to late fourth century, and the rise 
of Neo-Platonism, Old Stoic texts were becoming less influential than they had been 
in the second century.
A second difficulty in assessing the relative influence of Stoic thought is the differ-
ence between philosophical schools deriving from a founding figure whose writings 
formed the foundational curriculum (Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus) and a school 
whose founder was not the main source of what came to be the curriculum (Zeno, 
Cleanthes, Chrysippus). Not a single complete treatise of any of the early Stoics sur-
vives intact.2 The later Stoics themselves are in part responsible for this, with their 
emphasis on philosophy as ethics and their downplaying of philosophy as logic and 
physics. They seldom record the philosophical differences between these three heads 
of the Stoa in the third century BCE. Therefore, it is not possible to reconstruct all 
aspects of Zeno’s philosophy, nor to ascertain with certainty the innovations of Clean-
thes or Chrysippus. The lack of focus on the founding figures’ writings sets Stoicism 
1 Citing Jean-Baptiste Gourinat (1996:13–28) and Jean-Baptiste Gourinat and Jonathan Barnes 
(2009:10–12).
2 Cleanthes’ Hymn is a precious glimpse into the Old Stoa and makes us long to know what his philo-
sophical treatises would have looked like.
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apart from Platonism, the Peripatetics and Epicureanism, whose founding figures 
and their writings were not so profoundly eclipsed by their later schools, even as they 
were interpreted and reinterpreted.
A third difficulty in assessing the relative influence of Stoicism is the syncretism of 
ideas in the first and second centuries of the Common Era. It is hard to ascertain to 
what extent Stoic concepts may have been acculturated into philosophical discourse 
and were no longer distinctively Stoic in the period known as Middle Platonism. This 
can function to obscure Stoicism as well.
To this list of three we can add three further, interrelated contributions to the set 
of problems:
1) The early Christian view was that philosophy’s significance was circumscribed 
by God for a certain time and culture. Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–215 
CE), for instance, claimed that philosophy was “a direct gift of God to the 
Greeks before the Lord extended his appeal to the Greeks. ... So philosophy is 
a preparatory process; it opens the road for the person whom Christ brings to 
his final goal” (Clement, Stromateis, Book I, Ch. V (28.3): 42). Later Christian 
tradition, overlooking the statement’s rhetorical function, took this to mean 
that the time for philosophy was essentially over. Yet it reflects a context in 
which philosophy continues to be highly influential. Clement’s name is often 
associated with Platonism; however, his Paedagogus incorporates a great 
deal of Stoic thought, to the extent that it has been discussed as a Christian-
ised version of a lost work by Musonius (Pomeroy Parker, 1901:191–200). 
Clement’s view has inadvertently contributed to the difficulty in reaching an 
accurate assessment of the significance of philosophy in the second century 
in general, and in particular in reaching an assessment of the influence of 
Stoic thought.
2) Our view of Stoicism is filtered through the rise of Christian Platonism, par-
ticularly by the work of Origen, so that what later came to be the “winning 
side” obscures the earlier philosophical landscape. In the view of Christian 
Platonism, Stoic theology is neither deemed to be personal nor transcendent, 
as Origen implies when he writes: “The god of the Stoics, in as much as he is 
a body, sometimes has the whole substance as his commanding faculty; this 
is whenever the conflagration is in being; at other times, when world-order 
[diakosmēsis] exists, he comes to be in a part of substance” (Origen, Against 
Celsus 4.14, in Long & Sedley, vol. 1:276).
Yet Cleanthes’ “Hymn to Zeus” is both personal and arguably transcendent. One 
wonders whether Origen knew it. Certainly Origen chooses primarily to mention 
Stoic concepts which allow scope for polemical refutation.
3) Finally, more recent caricatures present a challenge to an accurate assessment 
of Stoicism. J. B. Lightfoot wrote in 1868:
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Like all the later systems of Greek philosophy, Stoicism was the offspring of despair ... 
The sublime intuitions of Plato had been found too vague and unsubstantial, and 
the subtle analyses of Aristotle too hard and cold, to satisfy the natural craving 
of man [sic] for some guidance which should teach him how to live and to die. 
(Lightfoot, 1868:271–272)
Even as recently as 2013, the Cambridge scholar Andrew Davison writes: “The 
Stoics differ markedly from Aristotle, and Plato before him, for the relatively mod-
est scope of their interests. Not for them sweeping metaphysical questions about the 
nature of being or the structure of knowledge...” (Davison, 2013:70).
Such caricatures are not just a Christian contribution. Peter Green also offers 
something of this view by downplaying any consistent content to Stoic philosophy. He 
emphasises the way in which Stoicism lent itself to being co-opted by the self-interests 
of the elite, and to serve as a superficial catch-all for a population needing to give 
meaning to everyday trials and triumphs — all of which served the preservation of 
the status quo (Green, 1990:631). Legitimate as these observations may be, they are 
retrospective, and thus cannot do justice to the minds of Stoic adherents nor those of 
the people they directly influenced, and with this static around, we end up not being 
able to encounter Stoicism on its own terms.
To this list of challenges, one could add textual and diachronic issues. However, the 
issues set out above sufficiently demonstrate that the challenges to giving an accurate 
assessment of Stoic influence are considerable. But now I will discuss the work of two 
scholars who have gone some way along this path.
Strategies to evaluate the significance of Stoicism
One can endeavour to show the presence and thus influence of Stoic philosophy by 
focussing on a distinctively Stoic concept (such as oikeiosis) and tracing its reception, 
development and adaptation. Particularly when this reception can be shown to cross 
confessional boundaries (pagan, Jewish, Christian), it suggests the influence or impact 
of the philosophy. This is Ramelli’s approach. She examines the works of Origen of 
Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa as the two main Patristic philosophers, regarding 
Origen as the one who Christianised the oikeiosis doctrine, and Gregory as the one 
who identified apokatastasis (recapitulation – restoration) as the Godhead’s oikeiosis 
or re-appropriation of all beings. She contends that “these Christian Platonists and 
other early Christian sources can help to clarify the Stoic oikeiosis doctrine itself ” 
(Ramelli, 2014:116, 137). Her study certainly suggests a widespread early influence 
of Stoic ideas which were adapted to a Christian Platonic framework.
Another approach is that of Troels Engberg-Pedersen, who does not work primar-
ily with comparisons of particular Stoic concepts or terms and other philosophical 
uses of them, but rather seeks to compare “whole patterns of thought” (Engberg-Ped-
ersen, 2000:45). In Paul and the Stoics, Engberg-Pedersen argues that the foundational 
structure of Stoic ethics is directly comparable with Paul’s concept of conversion and 
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the Christian life. Both Paul and the Stoics share a belief that the goal of human life is 
to be reached only through a conversion (through a crucial event or decision) from an 
individual, self-focussed, limited state of being to a state of being in which one is free 
to live a virtuous, altruistic, good life. Both systems recognise the reality (articulated 
earlier by Aristotle) that a fundamental weakness of will prevents us from living fully 
virtuous lives, and both recognise that a fundamental change must take place so that 
we may live in a way fully in keeping with the ultimate Good.
Engberg-Pedersen shows that the “crucial event or decision” for the Stoics is the 
decision to live according to Logos or Reason — called homologia — and so move 
from a way of life characterised by self-centredness to a way of life that is devoted to 
the common good through the love and practice of wisdom. For Paul, the “crucial 
event or decision” is a conversion to Christ and finding in Christ the freedom to live 
for the common good. Different though they may be, both pathways are focused 
on “the phenomenon of conversion conceptualised as a story” (Engberg-Pedersen, 
2000:36). Both systems involve a profound shift in what a person values and both 
see this conversion as a change of identity (Engberg-Pedersen, 2000:65). Both also 
see this as a move from babyhood to adulthood and envisage the formation of an 
ideal community where all socially based distinctions between people are abolished 
(Engberg-Pedersen, 2000:62, 78–79).
There is not scope within this article to do justice to Engberg-Pedersen’s argument, 
to the subsequent work he has published and his scholarly influence, nor to his critics. 
Despite the fact that not all his reviewers are persuaded that what he describes as a 
Stoic pattern of thought is distinctively Stoic,3 he nevertheless builds a very plausible 
case that key aspects of Paul’s thought are remarkably similar to what we know of 
Stoic ideas and patterns of thought.
Both Ramelli’s and Engberg-Pedersen’s approaches offer insights that are signifi-
cant for establishing that Stoic thought was influential in the first two centuries of the 
Common Era. More data is needed, however, to establish its relative influence vis à 
vis other philosophical schools. Given the difficulties I have outlined, we can see that 
this is methodologically challenging. The following three case studies offer insights 
into the relative significance of Stoic thought by examining the evidence for Stoic 
influence in non-Stoic writings.
First case study
Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho is set in Greece in the period directly after 
the Bar Kochba revolt (second Jewish war with Rome [132–135 CE]) and depicts 
3 Kathy Gaca, a classicist, thinks that this model outlines the dynamics of conversion and group identity 
more generally, and might describe various groups — Stoics and Pauline Christians, but also Epicureans, 
Isis-worshippers or others. For her, Engberg-Pedersen did not sufficiently rule out other contenders 
who fit the model in antiquity and could have been Paul’s sources, such as the Epicureans and mystery 




a respectful disputation between Justin as a Christian philosopher and a Jewish 
Rabbi called Trypho. Justin is an admirer of Plato, whom he cites at various points 
in Dialogue and whom he describes as furnishing his “mind with wings” (Dial. 2.6). 
Justin describes to Trypho his studies in philosophy. He began with a Stoic teacher, 
with whom he spent a considerable amount of time (Dial. 2.3), then moved on to a 
Peripatetic, then a Pythagorean, and finally a Platonist. This moving around was, in 
itself, not an uncommon phenomenon during the second Sophistic. Justin is describ-
ing a time when, as a pagan, he was seeking wisdom, though as a Christian he now 
describes this as a search for God. 
It is not stated in Dialogue that this 
took place in Flavia Neapolis. Nev-
ertheless, the fact that this took place 
in Justin’s young adulthood and that 
Justin describes the Platonic phi-
losopher as having lately settled in 
“our city”, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that these teachers were 
available in his hometown.
As we see in Chapters 1–2 of 
Dialogue, Justin is describing an 
encounter in the late thirties of the 
second century. Justin presents him-
self as a philosopher, or more spe-
cifically as a Christian philosopher. 
From this vantage point, he claims 
that the path to wisdom which led 
him to the Christian faith is the 
same as the path which led him to 
study philosophy in the first place; 
philosophical knowledge is one: μιᾶς 
οὔσης ταύτης ἐπιστήμης. It has, however, been diversified or factionalised by those 
who have prioritised loyalty to the philosophical schools’ founders as though that 
were the truth.
Platonism is the philosophy most prized by Justin, and he cites Plato with approval 
in Dialogue, Chapters 3–6 and 8.4 There are 142 chapters in Dialogue, so most of it 
is not about philosophy as such but is focussed on interpreting Scripture to Trypho 
and his friends, in order to persuade them of a Christian interpretation. Nevertheless, 
philosophy has functioned as Justin’s point of connection with Trypho.
4 For example, Dialogue 3.7: “Then how,” [Trypho] said, “could the philosophers think or say anything 
true about God, since they have no science of him, having neither seen nor heard him?” “But sir,” I said, 
“it is not with the eyes that the divine is visible to [philosophers], as other living things are. Rather it 
can be grasped only by the mind. So Plato says, and I believe him.”
Saint Justin Martyr (André Thevet, Les vrais 
pourtraits et vies des hommes illustres grecz, latins 
et payens [1584]) (Wikimedia Commons)
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Chapter 2 gives us some interesting information about Justin’s pre-Christian for-
mation. While it cannot be ruled out that factors of convenience played a role in his 
choice, selecting a path to wisdom would be an important and carefully considered 
decision. For our purposes, it is significant that Justin turned in the first instance to 
a Stoic for education in philosophy.
Second, it indicates that this mentoring was of some duration. Justin sets out 
two reasons for his dissatisfaction with the Stoic philosopher; first, that he did not 
know/understand God (ἠπίστατο, imperfect indicative middle, 3rd person singular — 
an ongoing state), and second, that the philosopher held that such instruction was 
unnecessary. It is interesting that theology was not deemed (by this instructor) to be 
a core part of the Stoic philosophical curriculum. It had been during the early Stoa, 
particularly — but not exclusively — during the period of Cleanthes.5 For Justin’s 
instructor at least, theology was deemed unnecessary.6 We cannot know for certain 
how widespread this view was.
We get another glimpse of Justin’s concept of Stoic theology in his Second Apol-
ogy, 7:8–9:
8  Even the Stoic philosophers, in their doctrine of morals, steadily honour the same 
things, so that it is evident that they are not very felicitous in what they say about 
principles and incorporeal things.
9  For if they say that human actions come to pass by fate, they will maintain either 
that God is nothing else than the things which are ever turning, and altering, and 
dissolving into the same things, and will appear to have had a comprehension only 
of things that are destructible, and to have looked on God Himself as emerging both 
in part and in whole in every wickedness; or that neither vice nor virtue is anything; 
which is contrary to every sound idea, reason, and sense. (trans. Blunt, 190–191)
In this view, God and fate seem indistinguishable. Here Justin is aligning himself 
with other opponents of Stoic thought who offer similar critiques (e.g. Calcidius 204, 
Long & Sedley, vol. 1:331, Plutarch On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1056 B-C, Long & 
Sedley, vol. 1:339). However, fate was understood by the Stoics as an intricate net-
work of causality (Aetius 1.28.4, Long & Sedley, vol. 1:336), whereas the divine was 
providential, transcending human mind, reason, strength and power (Cicero On 
the nature of the gods 2.16, Long & Sedley, vol. 1:324–325), and — at least for Clean-
thes — personal (Hymn to Zeus, Long & Sedley, vol. 1:326–327). Diogenes Laertius 
summarises Stoic theology this way:
They [the Stoics] say that god is a living being (ζῷον) which is immortal and rational 
or intelligent, perfect in happiness, not admitting of any evil, provident towards the 
5 Gellius 7.1.1–13 (Long & Sedley, vol. 1:329) cites a lost work by Chrysippus called On Providence.
6 Lactantius (c. 250–c. 325) mentions a dispute between the Academics and the Stoics about the gods 
as though it is a current debate, which suggests that at least some Stoics continued to teach theology. 
However the issue he mentions is as much about the providential nature of the world and hence physics 
as it is about theology. Lactantius, On the Anger of God 13:9–10 (Long & Sedley, vol. 1:330).
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world and its occupants, but not anthropomorphic. He is the creator of the whole and, 
as it were, the father of all, both generally and, in particular, that part of him which 
pervades all things, which is called by many descriptions according to his powers...
(Long & Sedley, vol. 1:323, modified)7
One wonders whether the influence of Stoic theology on early Christian thought 
would have been as thoroughly eclipsed as it has been if Justin’s first teacher had taken 
more of an interest in discussing Chrysippus’ treatise On Providence or Cleanthes’ 
Hymn to Zeus.
What we glean from this first case study is that in the first quarter of the second 
century, probably in the Roman city of Flavia Neapolis (modern Nablus in the West 
Bank), Stoic philosophy was not only being taught but was the first port of call for 
a young man seeking to further his education in philosophy. While Justin went on 
to become a Christian philosopher primarily in dialogue with Platonic thought, the 
Stoic influence did not disappear, as he is known as the early Christian philosopher 
of the Logos.8 He saw the seed of the Logos as implanted in all those who have a share 
in the spermatic word.9 Justin is the earliest writer of what we might call Christian 
Platonic apologetics,10 though Justin himself was critical of philosophical factions and 
may not have owned the designation.
Second case study
I now turn to Philo’s treatise entitled De aeternitate mundi (On the indestructibility of 
the world). In this treatise, Stoic philosophy is addressed explicitly and quite exten-
sively.11 Particular Stoic philosophers are named in it, including Cleanthes (1.90) and 
Chrysippus (1.48, 90, 94), whom Philo describes as “the most celebrated philosopher 
among them” (1.48); also Diogenes of Babylon, Boethus, Posidonius and Panaetius.
Philo was an elite educated Alexandrian Jew who drew eclectically on various 
philosophical traditions, primarily middle Platonism (Runia, 1986:495), but with 
both Stoic and Aristotelian influences. This treatise has a number of critical issues 
that make placing it firmly within Philo’s intellectual output difficult. The two key 
difficulties are, first, that as a philosophical treatise, it differs from most of his other 
writings, which endeavour to interpret Jewish Scripture and thought through Greek 
philosophical categories, while remaining true to the practice of Judaism. Second, the 
7 Long and Sedley use the translation “an animal’ for the term ζῷον. While this is can be an accurate 
translation of the term, in this context it appears to me to contradict the subsequent assertion that 
anthropomorphism (and hence also zoomorphism) is inadequate to describe God.
8 First Apology, Ch. 32, speaks of “the seed of God, the Word”.
9 Interestingly, he doesn’t include the Epicureans in this grouping, as we see in the Second Apology, Ch. 
15. Cf. Second Apology, Ch. 13.
10 Earlier examples of apologetics include Quadratus and Aristides, while Aristo of Pella was approximately 
Justin’s contemporary.
11 1.4, 8, 18, 48, 78, 89, 90, 94, 102.
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case which is argued for the eternity of the world appears to contradict Philo’s foun-
dational conviction that God is the Creator of the world. The most extended recent 
treatment of this treatise is by David Runia (Runia, 1981), who argues persuasively 
that this is the work of Philo himself and that he is making the case philosophically 
both for a Creator God and for the eternity of the world.12
For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on just one aspect of the treatise, 
namely a section of paragraph 24:
But some of those who used to hold a different opinion, being overpowered by truth, 
have changed their doctrine; for beauty has a power which is very attractive, and the 
truth is beyond all things beautiful, as falsehood on the contrary is enormously ugly; 
therefore Boethus, and Posidonius, and Panaetius, men of great learning in the Stoic 
doctrines, as if seized with a sudden inspiration, abandoning all the stories about 
conflagrations and regeneration, have come over to the more divine doctrine of the 
incorruptibility of the world.
Philo is celebrating the fact that key 
Stoic thinkers (Boethus of Sidon, second 
century BCE, Posidonius, c. 135–c. 50 
BCE, based in Rhodes, and his teacher 
Panaetius of Rhodes, c. 185–c. 110) had 
come to deny the Stoic doctrine of con-
flagration and regeneration. (Later in 
the treatise [76–77] he adds Diogenes 
[of Babylon, early to mid-second cen-
tury BCE] to the list of those who reject 
this doctrine.) From Philo’s delight at 
this “defection” we learn a number of 
things. First, these Stoic philosophers 
were known and were influential in 
Alexandria;13 we might also expect 
this to be the case in other centres of 
philosophical learning. Second, by the 
first century CE, some aspects of the 
Stoic curriculum were more influen-
tial than others. What we might term 
“cosmology”, “cosmogony” or “escha-
tology” were shifting concepts among some important Stoics, even while other 
aspects of physics — God in matter — continued to be highly influential through 
12 Philo, De aeternitate mundi 1.44 “...the works of us who are but mortal men may very appropriately be 
perishable, but the works of the immortal must in all consistency and reason be likewise imperishable, 
for it is natural that what is made should resemble the nature of the maker.”
13 In the sense of my definition of Stoic influence being visible in “a positive or negative refraction of a 
distinctively Stoic concept”.
Philo of Alexandria (André Thevet, Les vrais 
pourtraits et vies des hommes illustres grecz, 
latins et payens (1584) (Wikimedia Commons)
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the concept of the Logos (Long & Sedley, vol. 1: 277–279). Origen, in Against Celsus 
4.14, dated in the mid-third century in Alexandria, commented on the Stoic concept 
of conflagration, so it had not disappeared in the intervening two centuries after 
Philo’s treatise.
This case study suggests a number of things. First, Stoic views were known and 
discussed by the educated elite in the Hellenistic and early Roman periods, so that 
someone like Philo could rejoice in rapprochement between certain Stoics’ cosmologi-
cal views and those of Aristotle. Second, these views continued to be debated during 
the middle and late Stoa. Third, there was already scope among Stoics of the middle 
period to incorporate logical and cosmological concepts from elsewhere, without 
losing the designation “Stoic”.
Third case study
My final case study is a late first or early second century text set in Athens, namely 
Luke’s description of Paul’s visit to Athens in Acts 17.15–34. The provenance of this 
account is uncertain. In it we find that Paul encountered and disputed with both 
Epicurean and Stoic philosophers in Athens (Acts 17.18); philosophers representing 
other schools would have been there too, but are not explicitly mentioned.14 In Luke’s 
account of Paul’s visit to Athens, the Epicureans and Stoics are Paul’s audience and 
debating partners. Stoic and Epicurean philosophy developed in opposition to one 
another (Keener, 2014:2, 580–595).
Although the Epicureans are mentioned first in v. 18, nevertheless, one can argue 
that Paul is depicted as addressing himself primarily to the Stoics. The reasons for 
this are as follows. First, Paul begins his address with reference to an “altar to an 
unknown god” (v. 23). The Epicureans were known as those who regarded the gods 
as tranquil, blessed and remote, unaffected by trouble, concern, anger or favour 
(Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 76–77; Lucretius 6.68–79. Long & Sedley, vol. 1:140–
141). An additional and, we might say, prophylactic altar was not something that 
they would have recommended or valued.15 Second, Paul addresses his audience with 
phrases that would connect with a Stoic philosophical framework: “For ‘In him we 
live and move and have our being’; as even some of your own poets have said, ‘For 
we too are his offspring’” (v. 28). Paul is shown to use phrases from the Greek poetic 
14 We know for instance of Ammonius of Athens, an expert in Aristotle, who taught Plutarch in the sixties 
in Athens.
15 Anonymous Epicurean treatise on theology (POxy. 215) 1.4–24:
... nor, by Zeus, when someone or other speaks instead like this: ‘I fear all the gods whom I revere, 
and wish to make all the burnt offerings and dedications to them’. For although such a person may 
sometimes be more sophisticated than other individuals, there is not yet, along these lines either, a 
firm basis for piety. My friend, consider it a matter of supreme blessedness to have discriminated 
properly the most excellent thing that we can think of among existing things. Marvel at your 
discrimination of it, and revere it without fear. (Long & Sedley, vol. 1:144)
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tradition,16 but in doing so, he is evoking Stoic philosophical ideas best known to us 
through the (later) work of Marcus Aurelius:
Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one substance and one soul; 
and observe how all things have reference to one perception, the perception of this 
one living being; and how all things act with one movement; and how all things are 
the cooperating causes of all things that exist; observe too the continuous spinning 
of the thread and the structure of the web. (Meditations, iv. 40)
Of course, Paul (and Luke) did not know this particular articulation of Stoic ideas, 
but we can see that the choice of the phrase “In him we live and move and have our 
being” is an apt one for interesting a Stoic audience.
Third, Paul goes on to quote some words from the poem Phaenomena by a Greek 
poet, Aratus (c. 310–245 BCE), though without explicit acknowledgment of their 
source: “For we too are his offspring”. Here too this phrase is well chosen as a Stoic 
“teaser” — Aratus was an early Stoic, and his poem articulated Stoic views of divine 
16 J. Rendel Harris argued in a series of articles in the Expositor (Oct. 1906, 305–317; April. 1907, 332–337; 
Oct. 1912, 348–353) that this line — quoted in a 9th-century Syriac commentary on Acts by Bishop 
Isho’dad of Merv — goes back via Theodore of Mopsuestia to a fragment of Epimenides. This claim 
remains speculative.
Raphael, St Paul Preaching in Athens (1515) 
(Source: Royal Collection of the United Kingdom) (Wikimedia Commons)
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providence. So Luke indicates that the Stoics were not only Paul’s dialogue partners in 
Acts 17 but the ones he hoped to persuade. This suggests that Luke and his audience 
acknowledged Stoic influence in particular.
To summarise the findings of this brief case-study, we may say that the evidence 
of Acts 17 shows that Athens continued to be thought of as a centre of vigorous 
philosophical and theological debate in the late first century. The depiction of Paul’s 
speech to the Athenians shows a particular interest in Stoic thought. There are at least 
three indications in Acts 17.15–34 that Luke saw connections between the Pauline 
preaching/kerygma and Stoic thought. This suggests not only something about Paul’s 
conceptual framework and approach (as refracted through Luke) but also something 
about the influence of Stoic thought in this period.
Conclusion
I have offered three case studies analysing diverse first and second-century CE writ-
ings which are not explicitly Stoic and are not promoting Stoic thought, yet clearly 
contain evidence for the widespread presence of Stoic influence. This evidence from 
non-Stoic texts is a stronger argument for influence than could be made using only 
Stoic sources. What these analyses have shown is that Stoic ideas were known and 
discussed in this period among those who were not Stoic proponents. We learn from 
these passages that these writings show respect for Stoic ethics, as well as reservations 
about Stoic cosmological doctrines and theology. Stoic philosophy was the first choice 
of young Justin in Flavia Neapolis, Judea, in the first quarter of the second century, 
when he sought a philosophical education. It was topical for Philo in first century 
Alexandria, and it was depicted in Acts 17 (late first or early second century) as Paul’s 
primary dialogue and debating partner.
These case studies have given further evidence for Hahm’s assertion of the pre-
eminence of Stoic philosophy in this period. When seen together with other work 
which identifies Stoic concepts and patterns of thought in these centuries, the case 
for Stoic influence is strengthened. The significance of this finding is that the study 
of early Christianity in particular, which tends to overlook Stoicism, will need to take 
its influence more seriously. The extent of the influence is likely to depend more on 
specific context and circumstance than Hahm’s claim would imply. But the evidence 
of this article supports the claim that in disparate contexts in the Roman Empire of 
the first and second centuries, Stoic ideas — particularly ethical ideas — were both 
well-known and influential.
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